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State Aid, Industrial Restructuring and Privatization in the New German Länder:
Competition Policy with Case Studies of the Shipbuilding and Synthetic Fibres
Industries
The industrial restructuring in the new Länder of Germany consisted of closing down
production capacities created under the socialist regime. In turn, public and private
investments were channeled into those departments of the former „factories of the
people“ (VEBs) where new production capacities would be competitive on international
markets. The Treuhandanstalt was the main agent of this process, providing both active
management advice and enormous financial aids. As a result, this form of industrial
policy in East Germany was in permanent conflict with the EC-competition rules, in par-
ticular articles 92 and 93 of the EEC-Treaty, which rules out state aid that distorts
competition.
This paper analyzes the effects of state aids in East Germany on European competition.
We first discuss the specificity of post-socialist industrial restructuring in East Germany,
which consisted of the "enterprization" of socialist combines into capitalist enterprises.
Second, we review the economic rationale for state aids in the East German context by
distinguishing between static and dynamic arguments. Third, we apply these theoretical
arguments for state aid to two concrete case studies: shipbuilding and synthetic fibres.
We conclude from a static point of view that state aids can not be justified in both cases:
large capacities were added to already existing overcapacities in Europe. Considering
dynamic arguments, we assess the likelihood that the industrial restructuring may lead to
the creation of new East German enterprises that are at the leading edge of technology
and with a high productivity. While the East German cases of state aid were a novelty for
European competition policy, there might be important implications for other post-
socialist countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republic) once they join the
EU.ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Staatliche Beihilfen, Industriereform und Privatisierung in den neuen Bundes-
ländern -Untersuchung der Wettbewerbspolitik und Fallstudien des ostdeutschen
Schiffbaus und der Synthesefaserindustrie
Der industrielle Umstrukturierungsprozeß in den neuen Bundesländern bestand darin,
alte sozialistische Produktionskapazitäten abzubauen und Investitionen in diejenigen
Betriebsteile früherer VEBs zu lenken, in denen wettbewerbsfähige marktwirtschaftliche
Produktionskapazitäten aufgebaut werden konnten. Von staatlicher Seite kam der Treu-
handanstalt die Aufgabe zu, neben aktivem Management auch umfangreiche finanzielle
Mittel für die Umstrukturierung zur Verfügung zu stellen. Damit stand die Industriepoli-
tik in den neuen Bundesländern in ständigem Konflikt mit dem wettbewerblichen Regel-
werk der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, vor allem mit Artikeln 92 und 93 EWG-Vertrag,
die staatliche Beihilfen generell untersagen.
In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die wettbewerbspolitischen Auswirkungen der Indu-
striereformen in den neuen Bundesländern. Eingangs wird die post-sozialistische
Besonderheit dieses Prozesses erläutert, die in der "Unternehmisierung" sozialistischer
VEBs in marktwirtschaftliche Unternehmen bestand. Im Anschluß daran werden stati-
sche und dynamische Kriterien zur Bewertung staatlicher Beihilfen entwickelt. Diese
werden anhand von zwei Fallstudien getestet (Schiffbau und Synthesefasern). In beiden
Fällen erscheinen die staatlichen Beihilfen aus statischer Sicht problematisch, da mit
hohem finanziellem Aufwand neue Kapazitäten geschaffen wurden, die das Problem der
europäischen Überkapazitäten noch verschärften. Bei dynamischer Sichtweise fällt das
Ergebnis positiver aus, da die ostdeutschen Unternehmen bei erfolgreich abgeschlossener
Umstrukturierung zu den europaweit produktivsten gehören könnten. Die Erfahrung in
den neuen Bundesländern deutet auch darauf hin, daß bei einer EU-Erweiterung um
mittel- und osteuropäische Länder erhebliche wettbewerbspolitische Probleme zu erwar-
ten sind.1
Introduction
Industrial restructuring in the post-socialist new German Länder, the former GDR, was
the primary economic challenge of German reunification. The speed and complexity of
the process greatly exceeded expectations, as did the total incompatibility of East
German industry with West German, European and world-wide competition. Within
several months after economic union, industrial production had fallen by 50%. In this
context, the concept of state aid, as laid out in Art. 92 and 93 EC-Treaty, could not be
applied in the same fashion as in cases of gradual restructuring, experienced by EU-
industry over the last 20 years.
In this paper we analyze the economic rationale for state aid to newly emerging
enterprises in the post-socialist new German Länder between 1990 and 1994.
Restructuring and privatization took place in a very specific context, i.e., the passage
from socialism to post-socialism. The institutional framework for restructuring was the
German Treuhandanstalt (THA), an agency charged with an active industrial policy of
recreating a maximum of new private enterprises from the ruins of the socialist combines.
In early 1996, the results are mixed at best: 1.5 million new job creations in 15,000
enterprises, a deficit of 250 billion DM, many newly-created production sites on the
leading edge of technology, and about 20% of the active population without regular
employment.
In terms of competition policy, the THA's action was significant both on a German as
well as a European level, since the GDR immediately integrated with the EU. Heavy
state involvement and massive financial flows caused mixed reactions in German and
European industry which were directly affected by East German restructuring. The
compatibility of state aid in East Germany and its effect on European competition is one
of the key issues of the surrounding policy debate.
We first describe the specificity of post-socialist restructuring in East Germany. The task
was to transform multifunctional socialist industrial units, which were not developed with
the objective of obeying capital constraints, into profit-oriented enterprises operating in a
new, competitive environment (Section 1). We then discuss economic aspects of state
aid focusing on competition policy aspects.  (Section 2). These arguments are then
applied to two industries where state aid and European competition issues are particular
important: shipbuilding and synthetic fibers. We analyze the process of and obstacles to
transforming socialist combines into a large number of new enterprises, the specific
policy applied by the THA, and the effects of state aid on competition in the East
German and European shipbuilding and synthetic fiber industries (Sections 3 and 4).
In sum, our conclusions are as follows: from a static perspective, we do not see any
evidence in the two cases studied, that would justify the state aid on economic grounds.
In particular, European competitors were hurt through the introduction of new, modern
capacity on the market. When adopting a dynamic perspective, this result has to be
somewhat weakened. For East Germany, the process of industrial restructuring means
the creation of new capacities on the leading edge of technology and productivity. The
direct and capital-intensive interventions of the THA might have rescued some industrial2
enterprises in the new German Länder. As a consequence, industrial restructuring in East
Germany may have succeeded in setting up several modern firms and new industrial
tissue. Yet, when evaluating the process from a European perspective, the state aid
channeled through the THA was hardly compatible with usual EC competition policy.
1. The specificity of post-socialist industrial restructuring in East
Germany: turning socialist combines into enterprises
1.1 Difference between "classical" and "post-socialist" industrial restructuring
When analyzing the reform process in East Germany, one has to take into account the
very specificity of the case: that is, the post-socialist nature of industrial restructuring.
When the reform process began in 1990, the understanding of this particular process was
not yet developed; policy measures were defined in terms of an ordinary restructuring
process of an ordinary EU-member state. We contend that the nature of the restructuring
process in East Germany is very different from "classical" restructuring processes
witnessed in the EU over the last 20 years. The latter has always consisted of gradual
adaptation of industries or enterprises to gradually changing external conditions:
demand, costs, technical progress, etc. In this case, state aid is provided to facilitate the
structural change, either by lowering the barriers to exit for enterprises or by providing
different types of operating or investment aid, if the enterprise is deemed capable of
restructuring. Though the speed varies across countries and industrial sectors, standard
restructuring processes in the EU as in other industrialized countries proceed gradually
and, hence, take long time periods of up to several decades (e.g., textiles, shipbuilding,
steel).
In post-socialist economies, there is no such thing. Socialism was an attempt to
coordinate production and needs, without any reference to the role of money as a
universal equivalent and, hence, a constraint to production or consumption (von
Hirschhausen, 1995 a, b). In the socialist system, the very notion of prices, costs or
profits did not exist. Decisions concerning investment and production were subordinate
to the will of the Communist Party. Socialism has ended in Central and Eastern Europe
with the abandonment of this non-monetary system, through the introduction of money
as a universal equivalent and a certain liberalization of prices. We refer to this as the
process of "monetarization" of an economy. Monetarization then revealed real costs for
previously non-monetarized items, such as transport, energy, stocks, social services,
labor, etc. Under socialism, production was not constrained by money; in post-socialist
economies, however, questions of liquidity and cash-flow dominate the management of
production (Bomsel, 1995, Rouvez, 1995).
In all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the GDR, abandoning socialism
was a very rapid process. Monetary reforms and price liberalization were introduced
within a very brief period of time.
1 Hence, industrial structures that had been developed
                                               
1 Poland in January 1990, East Germany in July 1990, Czechoslovakia in January 1991, Russia in
January 1992, etc.3
over four decades (in Eastern Europe) or even seven decades (in the USSR), lost their
internal logic from one day to the next. The immediate change of relative prices implied
that the capital stock of the socialist combines, designed for one and only one technology
and output ("putty-clay technology"), was immediately devalued (Akerlof, et al., 1991).
Networks between combines fell apart due to the disappearance of COMECON, but also
due to the drop in demand and the appearance of transportation costs. The institutional
void further contributed to the dismantling of the old industrial structures: socialist
institutions (planning system coordinated by the Party, informal barter trade, legislation,
etc.) disappeared without being immediately replaced by the institutions of established
market economies (e.g., labor and capital markets, financial intermediaries, contract law,
etc. (see Schmieding, 1993)).
1.2 From socialist combines to capitalist enterprises
What does the post-socialist perspective imply for the process of industrial restructuring?
On-site empirical research has shown that socialist industrial units 
2 were not at all the
"public enterprises" for which they were commonly held in the standard economic
literature (Sachs, 1994); i.e., enterprises seeking to maximize profit or productivity under
constraints fixed by the state. Instead, socialist industrial units were multifunctional units
where the physical production of goods was just one activity among others and most
often not the central one. Other functions fulfilled by socialist industrial units included
the provision of social services to their members (housing, hospital, kindergarten, culture
club, vacation homes, etc.) and the exercise of strict political control in the form of the
Party nomenclature, union, para-military activities, prisons and individual repression. In
this context, the optimization of any individual objective of production was simply not
possible. Investment strategies were not geared toward the optimization of output, but
toward maintaining the political and social balance within the industrial units, as well as
between combines of a region, an industry, or an entire country.
Socialist combines were not "inefficient state enterprises", but rather multifunctional
units whose structure did not correspond to any capital constraint. It follows that
privatization can not be a sufficient measure for assuring efficient restructuring of these
combines. No capitalist entrepreneur, whether private or public, can be interested in
taking over a multifunctional industrial unit. The problem of industry restructuring turns
out to be larger and more complex than unbundling the over-integrated industry
structures (Aghion, et al., 1994). Instead, the very raison d'être of each production unit
has to be redefined according to the new products and new industrial networks they are
capable of integrating. Thus, two distinct questions make up the challenge of post-
socialist industrial restructuring: one concerns the process of ownership change and
privatization; the other, the transformation from socialist combines to capitalist
                                               
2 The term "socialist industrial unit" here designates the smallest administratively independent unit in
socialism, which was called "combinate" in most of the socialist countries. This term corresponds to
the VEB ("factory of the people") in the GDR, the "predpriyatie" in the Soviet Union, etc. The term
combinate must not be confused with the form of industrial coordination modeled in the 1980s
according to the East German "Kombinat".4
enterprises, i.e., the process of new  enterprise creation, or "enterprization" (Bomsel,
1995). The institutionalization of this process, i.e., the framework in which new
enterprises can be created, emerged as the single-most important issue of post-socialist
industrial reform, from East Germany to Russia.
In practice, the process of "enterprising" socialist industrial combines proceeds in two
steps. One is the decomposition of the socialist multifunctional structures, which were
designed for the non-monetary exchange of goods. The second, is the creation of new
enterprises, adapted to meeting market demand in a competitive environment and subject
to a monetary constraint. Note that this process of "creative destruction" does not
necessarily imply the physical destruction of old machinery, sites, and the shedding of
former employees. Instead, it is the old network relations between productive units that
are abandoned, and new ones that are created. The start-up of new greenfield enterprises
also falls in the category of enterprization.
The post-socialist vision of industry reform implies that there can be no "restructuring"
of capacities of a socialist industrial unit, in the proper sense. In other words, if the
socialist productive network for which capacities were created disappears, the capacities
of this network also disappear. What follows is the process of creation, i.e., the
development of new capacities, serving a new market, with a new product, under a new
brand name and competing with other firms in a new competitive environment. From an
industrial economist's perspective, this is not a process of "restructuring" of capacity.
Instead, it has to be regarded as the complete abandonment of the socialist capacities,
and the creation of new productive capacities adopted to the capitalist market economy.
3
This interpretation of post-socialist reform also has an important impact on the analysis
of competition issues. In socialist times, combines did export to Western markets, but
never under real conditions of competitive markets. Instead, exports were "planned",
both in quantity and in price. In post-socialism, however, products from Central and
Eastern Europe have entered new markets, both in Western Europe and overseas. These
                                               
3 One example might clarify this point: until 1990, the socialist factory of the people "VEB
Sachsenring Zwickau", employing 12,000, had a capacity of 160,000 units of the "Trabant": a
strange combination between a fairground go-cart and a 2-period motor, fueled with a sulfurous
CnH2n+2-containing liquid. The Trabant was delivered, not sold, to "deserving domestic citizens"
with an average waiting list period of 10-12 years. The VEB Sachsenring Zwickau also ran a full
program of social services, amongst them: housing, schools, a holiday resort, a polyclinic and a
football team. The VEB was managed and controlled by the Party-nomenclature. This is what we
have called capacity in a "socialist industrial unit".
In 1996, the situation has radically changed. The site, employing about 2,000, now features a
production facility for the most recent Volkswagen "Polo" model, with a capacity of about 250,000 a
year. The model successfully competes with the European automobile markets. The organization of
production is "just-in-time", which means that the largest possible number of tasks is outsourced.
This corresponds to what one would call capacity in a capitalist enterprise.
The point is the following: would anyone still seriously contend that the change from the socialist
facility producing the Trabant to the JIT-production facility for the VW-Polo has anything to do with
the "restructuring of capacity"? Or should it not be regarded as the shedding of old capacity (for the
Trabant) and the creation of new (VW-Polo) capacity?5
products have undergone either a complete change, or at least significant innovation, in
order to become competitive on these markets. Hence, the capacity created in post-
socialist enterprises has to be considered as new capacity from the Western point of
view. By enterprizing the East German combines, the Treuhandanstalt implicitly added
new capacity to the EC-market to which the East German producers now belonged.
1.3 The East German solution:  industrial policy of active, local restructuring
by the Treuhandanstalt
Though East Germany is certainly a special case due to the peculiar context of German
reunification, economic reforms have to be considered as a case of post-socialist reform.
Radical economic reform was only enacted in July 1990: this was the economic,
monetary and social union between the GDR and the FRG. As one of the earliest and
most radical cases of post-socialist reform, the East German case offers important insight
for other reforming countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
The institutional setting for industrial reform in East Germany was unique as well: the
responsibility for managing the process of new enterprise creation and for privatization
was carried by one single institution, the Treuhandanstalt (THA). Originally, the THA
was created as the privatization arm of German unification, only. However, after the
poorly anticipated collapse of East German industry following monetary union of July
1990, the THA had to change its strategy: accepting to "assume full responsibility as the
owner of its enterprises, including restructuring" (the so-called common declaration of
March 1991). Two major policy implications were derived from this reorientation: first,
the THA created 15 decentralized and largely independent regional agencies all over the
country; second, it put its own personnel directly into the main executive positions of its
combines. To this end, it accelerated the integration of West German and European
managers - up to a maximum of 5,000 in 1992. Thus, rather than simply selling off
combines from its Berlin headquarters, the THA could attack the restructuring of each
factory directly on-site. The THA managers were in charge of
* evaluating all technical alternatives to convert a maximum of the productive functions
of the combines into new enterprises,
* combining a local approach with sectoral considerations,
* coordinating restructuring activities with the separation and closures of nonproductive
functions (housing, infrastructure, transport),
* facilitating the conditions for Management Buy-Outs of individual departments of the
former combines,
* negotiating with local administration over the integration of the new industrial
structures into regional development plans (highways, electricity, etc.).6
The results of this effort are quite remarkable: between 1990 and 1994, the THA
achieved the split-up of 2,500 socialist combines, and actively pursued the creation of
about 14,000 new enterprises. 1.5 million new jobs were created.
4 The price of the
operation was high: instead of an expected profit of DM 600 billion, the THA has
accumulated a loss of about DM 250 billion.
5 Yet the financial aspects and the continued
monetary support from West Germany and the EU are but one aspect. Another
specificity of the East German case is the fact that the THA was the major institutional
innovation of post-socialist East Germany, whereas other state structures were simply
taken over from the old Federal Republic. This also distinguishes the East German case
from other post-socialist countries, where the economic, legal and institutional
framework of restructuring have to be built from scratch.
1.4 Implication for the nature of aid
The EC-Treaty of 1957 could not possibly include anything related to post-socialist
industrial restructuring. How could the situation in East Germany, which became part of
the EC in July 1990, be treated within that framework? How should state aid be dealt
with in a country where, from one day to the next, almost all industrial enterprises
needed some form of state aid in order to survive ?
From the beginning, the European Commission accepted the specificity of post-socialist
restructuring in East Germany. Though maintaining Art. 92 of the Treaty of Rome as its
legal basis, the Commission conceded rapidly "that the task of the THA - i.e., support the
transformation of a socialist planned economy into a market economy - is without
precedent."
6 Henceforth, the Commission redefined the nature of the aid provided to
East German industry according to the following principles:
7
a) Before any privatization, the THA could provide guarantees and even loans to those
enterprises willing to engage in restructuring. Even though the ratio of bad debts was
very high for the THA enterprises, most of them had no other security and were
therefore unable to obtain any bank credit. Therefore, THA guarantees and even loans to
those enterprises were not to be considered as state aid. The support provided to
enterprises in sensitive branches (steel, shipbuilding, synthetic fibers, motor vehicles,
fishing, agriculture) had to be reported to the Commission according to Art. 93,3 of the
EC-Treaty.
                                               
4 The combines employed 3.4 million at the time of the GDR. The initial shock of reunification on the
East German labor market is only slowly subsiding. In April 1995, the shortfall of "regular
employment" was still 24%, down from 30% in the first half of 1993 and 34% in the first half of
1991. They are composed of 1.040 million unemployed, and 1.039 million "persons in labor market
measures" (reconversion, technical education, early retirement, etc.) (Employment Observatory East
Germany, 1995).
5 This sum is equal to total East German GDP in 1994; see Brücker (1995).
6  SG (91) D/17825.
7 Defined in the Commission decision on the notification procedure for privatization by the THA (SG
(91) D/17825).7
b) The annulation of old debts dating from before July 1, 1990 by the THA was not to be
considered as state aid either, as long as they originated "exclusively on arbitrary
decisions of the former socialist planned economy."
c) The THA could provide financial support for cleaning up environmental hazards
caused by its enterprises before the July 1, 1990 deadline.
d) As for the practice of auctioning, no case in which the THA sold off an enterprise to
the highest bidder or a single bidder - after having conducted an international call for
tender - was supposed to include state aid. This point turned out to be important, since
the value of THA enterprises, when offered to the European market, turned out to be
very low, if not negative. Only in those (few) cases where an enterprise was not sold to
the highest bidder, did the Commission reserve the right to inquire into the compatibility
of the sale with Art. 92 (2) of the EC-Treaty.
The very flexible treatment of THA action towards its enterprises turned out to be a
crucial instrument in the day-to-day supervision of East German restructuring. Later, as
the list of THA enterprises diminished, the Commission hardened its position on state
aid, but continued to treat all cases with much flexibility.
8
Retrospectively, one observes that the Commission went way beyond the strict limits
associated with "classical" restructuring, as defined most recently in the "Guidelines on
state aids to the rescuing and re-structuring of firms in difficulty".
9 Had one considered
the case of the East German combines as "classical" cases of restructuring, one would
have had to strictly apply Articles 92 and 93 of the EC-Treaty. This, in turn, would have
meant the immediate end to practically all East German industry. The East German case
had forced the Commission to bend Articles 92 and 93 EC-Treaty as it had never done
before and, most likely, will never have to do again.
1.5 Implications on industrial restructuring in other post-socialist countries
associated with the EU
Post-socialist industrial restructuring is increasingly attracting the attention of
researchers and policy makers (Portes, 1994). Whereas macroeconomic stability was
rapidly achieved in all Central and Eastern European countries, the task of transforming
socialist combines into market oriented enterprises is a long-term process. Privatization
                                               
8 SG (92) D/17613 of December 1992 clarified and modified four points on which a dispute with the
German government had emerged during the course of 1991 and 1992: THA was required to report
cases of continued financing for enterprises with more than 1,500 employees and with financial
obligations exceeding DM 150 million. Second, "packages" of a "good" and a "bad" enterprise which
the THA offered in order to get rid of the "bad" enterprise, had to be reported whenever they
exceeded 1,000 jobs. Third, in cases of re-privatization, the Commission defined precise criteria to
limit the compensation the THA could provide to former owners for the loss of value. Finally, sales
to the highest bidder had to be reported whenever the price was negative and employment in the
enterprise concerned exceeded 1,000.
9 OJ 94/C/368/12.8
is a necessary but insufficient condition for succeeding structural change. The East
German case is an ideal type of privatization and restructuring carried out
simultaneously.
In many respects, the East German experience has important implications for the
restructuring process in other post-socialist countries; in particular, the countries
approaching EU-membership (Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). These countries cannot and
probably should not adopt the same institutional framework. In post-socialist countries
other than the GDR, the process of restructuring can not be handled by one state
institution and foreign investors. The peculiarity of the East German case was that
restructuring and privatization were managed by the same institution, equipped with
unlimited resources. The separation of productive and social assets coincided with the
implementation of investment projects. Regional and sectoral aspects of restructuring
were coordinated.
Other post-socialist countries are searching for other institutional settings adapted to
their situation. Today, a variety of corporate governance structures is emerging for
setting up new enterprises (Gray, Frydman, Rapaczinski, 1995, von Hirschhausen,
1996b). Basically, two patterns can be identified so far:
1) the "classical" approach with a central agency, controlling privatization, formally, but
lacking control over its large number of enterprises;
2) the mass-privatization approach of diversifying and diluting ownership and control,
favoring informal holding companies and insider control.
The centerpiece of the "classical" standardized approach is an ambitious privatization law
and an agency charged with carrying out the so-called large-scale privatization: first,
through corporatization (i.e., the definition of legally defined state-owned enterprises),
and second, by selling these enterprises - as such - to the highest bidder.
10 The condition
underlying this approach is the capability of state institutions to evaluate the restructuring
potential of "their" enterprises and exert owner-like control. Both conditions have only
partially been fulfilled as one observes, for example, in Poland, Hungary and Estonia.
The second type of corporate governance in post-socialism has emerged in countries
where mass-privatization was the dominant characteristic. The unorthodox method of
mass-distributing ownership rights to the entire population was preferred on the
following grounds: the populist appeal and considerations of "fairness and equity", the
speed of operation, the simplicity of administration, and finally, the understanding that
"classical" privatization - carried out for example with the speed it was done in the UK -
would take "at least 2,000 years" (Sachs, 1994). Although, technically, mass
privatization succeeded and lead to high rates of privatization, it can not be concluded
that the emerging governance structures were clear and efficient. Instead, one observes
                                               
10 This approach is called classic because it is based upon the standard privatization programs in
Western Europe, notably in Great Britain, during the 1970s and 80s.9
the concentration of ownership rights in the hands of employees and/or managers and a
few investment funds; the degree of insider control exceeds expectations. In most cases,
a peculiar form of ownership-control emerged, the "post-socialist industrial holding
company".
2. Economic rationale for state aid
It is clear that political aspects regarding German unification and the integration of the
new German Länder into the EU have played an important role in the debate about state
aid to the former combinates.  The magnitude of the task at hand became apparent by
1991 when the "sudden death" of East German industry seemed eminent. The rationale
put forth by the German government can be summarized as relatively strict state
intervention in order to prevent the new Länder from vanishing from the economic map.
Whether subsequent measures taken by the THA have been economically efficient is still
very much under debate and possibly too early to judge since many of the measures put
in place have not fully unfolded. Despite the fact that decisions are based on political and
social considerations, it is important to judge those policy decisions on economic
grounds.  Below we shall analyze the restructuring of East German industry from the
point of view of competition policy.  To be sure, we will not consider any political or
social aspects of restructuring that might explain the actions of the THA, but merely
focus on the economics of the situation and how it affects competition at the European
level.  In this sense, our analysis is normative, rather than descriptive.  The approach we
are taking is one where we begin outlining the economic arguments under which state aid
could be justifiable from an economic efficiency perspective.  In particular, we specify
the market and firm specific conditions which need to be present for the arguments to
follow through.  If the conditions of an economic rationale for state aid are not met, state
aid must be termed as economically wasteful.  The presence of these conditions is then
assessed empirically in the context of two important cases, which we believe have
relevance over and above their immediate industries: the shipbuilding industry and the
synthetic fiber industry. Before we turn to these cases we next summarize the economic
rationale for state aid.
2.1 Increase competition in the case of oligopolistic demand or supply
structures:  static arguments
State aid can be economically meaningful if it used to increase competition in an
otherwise imperfectly competitive market.  Policies to foster competition can take a
variety of forms, one of which is direct state aid (reducing entry barriers is another
prominent policy).  Clearly the economic argument in favor of state intervention in this
case is based on the rationale that a relatively small amount of aid can create a viable
competitor, increase competition, lower prices, increase innovation, and consumer
welfare.
It is clear that the above argument rests on various assumptions which need to be
present. We shall spell out four of them explicitly. The first assumption is that the10
amount of aid necessary to increase the number of players is relatively small.  In other
words, the deadweight loss created by imperfect competition is reduced by an amount
larger than the aid.  This, in turn, depends on the demand elasticities, the number of
competitors in the market, and the efficiency differential between the subsidized and the
unsubsidized firms.  For instance, increasing the number of competitors by one through
state aid in a market which is not concentrated is unlikely to satisfy this criterion.
Furthermore, if the efficiency gap is large, the cost of fostering competition is too high to
justify. A second assumption implicit in the argument in favor of state aid is that firms do
not collude. If competition is increased by keeping another competitor in the market, it is
necessary to assume that competition actually takes place. Tacit or explicit collusion
would merely consume the aid, without passing the benefits on to consumers. It is thus
imperative to have an effective competition policy in order to give economic merit to an
efficient industrial policy. Next, there is an assumption regarding the production
technology: economies of scale must not be too high. This well-known argument refers
to the intrinsic trade-off between economies of scale and competition. Clearly, if
economies of scale are present, a limited number of firms might be desirable. An extreme
case of this would be a natural monopoly. Increasing competition through state aid
would be undesirable in such cases. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the argument
rests on the assumption of imperfect competition. In particular, there should be no supply
or demand substitutes available (i.e., there is market power). Moreover, the existence of
overcapacities, though one could justify them as evidence of market power
11, is
indicative of excessive competition.
In sum, state aid can be economically justified in a static framework, whenever a market
is imperfectly competitive.  It is worth emphasizing that the economic efficiency of state
aid is not automatically satisfied for all imperfectly competitive markets.  In general, the
implications for economic efficiency rest on the careful weighing of the several forces
discussed above. The final rationale for state aid is determined by the relative magnitude
of these forces and has to be done through a case by case analysis.  Examples of such an
evaluation of an active European industrial policy has been done recently by Neven and
Seabright (1995) for the European Commercial Aircraft industry, as well as by Neven,
Röller, and Waverman (1993) for the European Satellite industry.
2.2 Temporary aid for potentially viable enterprises:  dynamic arguments
Note that the argument in the previous section does not depend on the enterprise
becoming more productive over time.  A second argument in favor of state aid is that an
enterprise might increase its efficiency and/or productivity after its survival has been
guaranteed for a certain time through state aid. In this case, limited support to an
enterprise can result in establishing an efficient competitor over the long run.  Clearly this
argument can be (mis)used in many instances where the resulting state-aid does nothing
to increase the productivity of the receiving firm (in fact one could  argue that
productivity falls as a result of state aid).  In any event it is imperative that the aid is
                                               
11 Excess capacities can be used by an incumbent monopolist to deter entry, by credibly threatening to
expand production in the face of entry.11
committed to for a limited amount of time in order to prevent an inefficient firm from
asking for more and more subsidies.
As mentioned above, the value of the "capital" inherited from socialism can be regarded
as low or even negative. This is consistent with the fact that (almost) no western
entrepreneur has been willing to pay a positive price for a socialist combinate.  In this
context, state aid for short-term survival can be justified on the grounds that it increases
the medium-term capital value of some enterprises. The key question is, of course, why a
state institution, and not private investors, would have the knowledge to select such
enterprises. Following is a list of possible reasons.
2.2.1: Separation of productive and social assets as a prerequisite for successful
restructuring
As long as the socialist industrial units remain multifunctional, the real value of their
productive assets can not be known. Temporary aid can be justified if it enables the
former socialist factory to proceed with the unbundling of social functions. These should
be transferred to new state institutions, taken over by private institutions, or simply be
closed. As long as it is uncertain which parts of the multifunctional units are available for
restructuring, there can be no competition for them. Whether one centralized state
institution is more efficient in achieving the process of unbundling than a decentralized
auction, remains an open question. But as long as kindergartens, schools, public
transport, energy, etc., are at the charge of the enterprise, no market-oriented capital
value can be determined for the factory. During that period, state aid can be justified:
transaction costs to the state for transferring the social functions are well below those of
a new private investor.
2.2.2: Limiting the risk of short-term disappearance of enterprises
Independent of the question of social assets, the risk of severe destruction of the
industrial base is a serious problem that has not been given sufficient attention in the
early phase of post-socialist reform. Price liberalization and the end of socialist pricing
mechanisms result in a radical change in relative prices. Yet, these prices are not stable in
the short-run, thus making it difficult to make large-scale restructuring decisions in an
uncertain environment. Enterprises can benefit from windfall profits if their products'
prices rise. It is more likely, though, that a fall in prices results in a "windfall loss" to an
enterprise. The latter is particularly true for enterprises in heavy industry, whose
products were systematically kept high under socialism, and whose costs (in particular
energy) were kept low.  In eastern Germany, the shock of the change in relative prices
was extreme in July 1990. As a result, about 5,000 of the 8,000 enterprises that THA
owned became illiquid by late 1990 (Webber, 1994). In this situation, there is no direct
correlation between the financial result of an enterprise in 1990, and its real, medium-run
capital value. Even though price expectations in the former GDR stabilized rapidly - as a
result of economic union with West Germany - no operational indicator existed for
evaluating enterprises. Capital markets, that might have played such a role in developed
capitalist market economies, did not yet exist. In the East German case, the risks
associated with the unstable environment was so large that only the government could12
provide the necessary insurance: no private investor would have been willing to assume
the short-term risk of such a large number of enterprises. By keeping several thousand
enterprises afloat, the state could "buy time" for the enterprises concerned. As the
information base improved, potential investors benefited from this policy.
2.2.3: Positive externalities
Another role for government is one of credible commitment, thereby (indirectly)
increasing the chances of other private enterprises engaging in the restructuring process.
In other words, externalities might exist from regional or sectoral investment. Whenever
such externalities are present a coordination problem can arise, leading to basically two
types of outcomes:  one, where no one invests (i.e., investment is done in other regions),
and the other, where everyone invests. Which of the two outcomes materializes depends
crucially on the expectations of the parties involved. To put it differently, if everybody
expects that others will not invest, no one will invest, and the expectation is indeed
fulfilled. Alternatively, if everyone expects that others will invest, then it is financially
attractive to invest (because of the externality), and again, the expectations are fulfilled.
In the language of game theory, there are multiple equilibria which are self-fulfilling.
Clearly, in such cases, the better outcome is accomplished by government moving first,
triggering a "band wagon" of other investors.
12
In sum, the case for state aid can be made by taking a dynamic perspective. As in the
previous section, state aid has to be carefully justified, and certain conditions have to be
satisfied: 1) firms will increase their productivity beyond other competitors in a
reasonable amount of time, and 2) the financial aid can not otherwise be provided
through the financial sector.  If these two conditions are met then the positive medium-
run effect of aid to some firms might outweigh the negative short-run effects.
On the other hand, there are also considerable dangers that can cause well-intentioned
state aid to fall short of its goal.  The most obvious shortcoming of state aid in the
dynamic context is the ability of governments to pick winners. It is often convincingly
argued that private sources are in an equal or better position than government to assess
the potential for profitable investments (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Indeed, the
evidence for government to target so-called strategic industries or national champions is
not inconsistent with this assertion. Another problem is the issue of credible timing when
aid is supposed to be phased-out over time. Governments need to set firm deadlines for
reducing or terminating financial assistance so that enterprises have the correct incentives
to restructure. The difficulty here is one of time (in)consistency: given that the enterprise
has not achieved viability by the agreed upon date, it is unlikely that government would
                                               
12 Two recent examples from the East German steel industry can illustrate this point. In 1990, there
was a tacit understanding among West European enterprises, facing another overcapacity crisis, not
to invest in East German capacities for long products (Maxhütte Unterwellenborn) or flat products
(EKO Stahl AG Eisenhüttenstadt). Only when THA showed its determination not to abandon the two
sites did the cartel of refuseniks break up, and a "rush" on the two sites began: four candidates for the
Maxhütte, three four EKO (see Hirschhausen, 1995a, Chapter 7).13
abolish the aid. If firms are aware of this, the incentive to restructure is severely
dampened.
2.3 Rent Shifting:  A National Perspective
The final argument in favor of state aid is, strictly speaking, not an economic efficiency
rationale. The argument is often made in the context of the case of Airbus vs. Boeing. It
can be shown that an active industrial policy on the part of one country can be used to
shift some rent from the foreign competitor to the domestic enterprise.
13 The outcome of
this is that welfare for the domestic market increases. In general, the above argument
depends on a variety of assumptions. Most importantly for our purposes, a crucial
prerequisite for this reasoning is the existence of a highly concentrated market structure.
Oligopolistic competition is necessary for the existence of rent which can then be
transferred from one firm to another.
For example, state aid to East German producers can be efficient from a German
point of view if it succeeds in creating and allocating rents to German producers, that
would not have benefited otherwise. In other words, depending upon which
perspective one adopts, the results of the analysis will differ.
14 In the interpretation of
the case studies, we will have to make that distinction. A situation where the EU loses
in terms of social welfare may still be a winning game for an individual nation, or an
enterprise.
We now turn to the empirical evidence presented by THA-cases. In the following
sections, we shall apply the above mentioned hypothesis to two concrete cases:
shipbuilding and synthetic fibers. The two cases were chosen for several reasons: In
both branches, the former GDR had developed considerable capacities, and seemed, in
1989, to be at least partially competitive on the European level. Both industries'
capacities corresponded to an important market share in Western Europe (12% in
chemical fibers, 14% in shipbuilding). Whereas the chemical fiber plants were spread
all over the territory of the GDR, shipbuilding was concentrated on the Baltic
seashore in only one Land (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern); it was the only significant
industrial activity in the GDR north of Berlin. Finally, from an EU point of view, both
shipbuilding and synthetic fibers fall under special legislation regulating state aid in the
difficult process of restructuring these industries: the code on aid to the synthetic fiber
industry
15 and several Council Directives on shipbuilding, the latest being the 7th.
16
                                               
13 This is referred to as "strategic trade policy", see also Neven and Seabright (1995).
14 In the Airbus-Boeing case, state aid was efficient from a European point of view, whereas it seems to
have been inefficient from a US point of view.
15 92/C 346/02.
16 90/684/EEC, prolonged through 93/115/EEC and 94/73/EC.14
3. The enterprization of the East German shipbuilding industry
3.1 From one socialist combine to five new shipbuilding enterprises
The restructuring of the East German shipbuilding industry is representative of the East
German process in several aspects: None of the socialist shipyards of the former "VEB
Schiffbau Kombinat" was economically viable after the monetary union of July 1990.
Without massive THA intervention, the seven would have perished altogether. Also, in
no case did any "classical" restructuring take place; instead, old capacity, mainly
designed for mass production of low value-added ships, was gradually removed and new
capacity was built and put on international, mainly Western European markets. Between
July 1990 and summer 1992, the THA was the only major actor in the process of
restructuring.
In 1990 the East German shipbuilding industry consisted of one large combine in which
production was coordinated according to "socialist work-sharing" principles. Each of the
seven sites was designed as a multifunctional unit in which the production of ships was
but one activity; other functions were the provision of social services to employees (such
as housing, education, child care, health care, vacation, cultural activities, access to
consumer goods, transport, etc.) and the maintenance of political activity. Already in
early 1990, West European industrialists voiced concern about the financial viability of
the seven yards. With the monetary union, these concerns materialized even more
dramatically than foreseen: under the price shock of July 1990 and deprived of their
former clients in the Soviet Union, all seven producers ran losses in 1990 and 1991.
17
In the first instance, the THA decided that the socialist combine was to be transformed
into a large holding company, called DMS (Deutsche Maschinen- und Schiffbau AG).
This large holding company combined not only all the shipyards of the former GDR, but
also the departments for mechanical construction, equipment and engineering.
18 A
consultant study concluded that, after the necessary capacity reductions and spin-offs,
"the viability of the East German shipyards was never seriously in doubt."
19 Hence, the
                                               
17 The losses amounted to several hundred million DM. Dr. Ken-Peter Paulin, Director of the
Treuhandanstalt for vehicle construction , expressed the situation (ex-post) as bluntly as this: "We
should have liquidated all shipyards, immediately, in order to limit the losses stemming from the
<loss-making> contracts already signed." (cf. Treuhandanstalt Dokumentation 1990-1994, vol. 5, p.
196)
18 The only units that were immediately separated from the former VEB were the production of civil
goods (camping-car elements, refrigerators, furniture), social assets (hospitals, holiday resorts), and
the thrust of the former combine: several commercial market gardens (cf. Treuhand Dokumentation,
vol. 5, p. 105 ff).
19 ibid., p. 108.15
Holding DMS started operation in January 1991, financed through liquidity credits from
the THA, already amounting to DM 900 million by July 1991.
However, the concept of a state holding company turned out to be politically unwanted,
as it did not correspond to the THA strategy of splitting up combines rapidly. Also, the
risk that substantial financial resources of the THA would be channeled through the
holding was unacceptable to the THA Board. After one year of operation, in March
1992, the DMS Holding company was dissolved, and a strategy of partial privatization
started. The THA approached virtually every large Western European shipbuilder,
promising substantial operating and investment aid. Yet most large Western shipbuilders
hesitated to take over supplementary capacity at a time when capacity utilization rates in
Europe were below 4/5. In this first instance, the general tendency among the large
shipbuilding groups was not to engage in the development of new overcapacities in East
Germany.
Nevertheless, the THA's determination to save a large part of the industry remained
unbroken. It gradually improved the conditions for potential investors, until the retention
of some Western yards broke. The two largest European groups conceded to integrate
the three large East German shipyards: Bremer Vulkan (Germany), fully taking over the
MTW and a majority of the Volkswerft; while the Kvaerner Group (Norway) selected
the Warnow Werft from the Warnow-Neptun package it was initially offered.
20 Thus,
both groups increased their world market share significantly (from 1.6% to 2.8% and
from 2.9% to 3.5%, respectively). Besides the increase in market share, the takeovers
allowed the groups to widen the scope of their existing yards.
21 The deals, negotiated
during 1991/92, were finally signed between late 1992 and mid-1993.
During this period, it was the THA alone, that engaged in the physical and financial
restructuring of the East German yards. With regard to financial restructuring, the THA
took over old debts, financed liquidity credits, and took over losses. On the real side, it
decided on the splitting up of the former structures into smaller pieces, creating new,
independent shipyards, each of them specializing in a particular market segment (from
small fishing boats to large petroleum tankers). Thus, the THA carried out an active
strategy of restructuring for each of the combines concerned, according to a "Master-
Plan" conceived for the entire shipbuilding industry. This first phase consisted of
restructuring only, and had nothing to do with privatization. Though negotiations with
potential investors had started earlier, privatization first took place in 1992/93, i.e., 2-3
years after the start of the restructuring by the THA. The task of the private investors,
then, was the re-organization of business administration and the carrying out of
investment schemes, which were largely financed by the THA as well. Thus, a new
industrial structure emerged in the form of five new, independent enterprises, with a new
                                               
20 cf. Treuhand Dokumentation. For a case-study of the Neptun-Warnow-Werft, see also Damaris and
Wolff (1993).
21 Bremer Vulkan owned four other yards at the time; Kvaerner, even eight (among them, Europe's
second largest, the Masa Yards, with a capacity of about 300.000 CGT, alone).16
product mix, integrated into West German or European industrial groups, and engaging
in a radical conversion of their capital equipment.
Table 1 shows a representative case of enterprization. Under socialism, the Mathias
These Werft VEB ("factory of the people ") was part of the Schiffbau-combine. It had
two small building berths, producing a standardized product range. Its main client was
the Soviet Union. At a total employment of 6,000, the shipyard featured 135,000 CGT of
what we have called "socialist" capacity (left column). In contrast, once enterprization
and restructuring have succeeded, a completely new shipyard will emerge, featuring a
new dry dock, one of the most modern "compact yards" in Europe, and a new product
range (right column). As a result, one has to consider that 135,000 CGT of "socialist
capacity" have disappeared, and about 100,000 CGT of "new" capacity have been
installed, i.e., market economy oriented capacity.
Table 2 provides general basic data on the restructuring of the East German shipbuilding
industry between 1990 and early 1996 
22 (the financial collapse and liquidation of the
Bremer Vulkan and its dismantling in 1996 are not yet taken into account).
Two key ratios can be derived from Table 2 that will be used in the evaluation of state
aid. One is the private investment/public expenditure ratio (PPR), which measures the
ratio of private investment over the total expenditures incurred by the THA and other
state institutions, i.e., expenditures before privatization, and the different kinds of state
aid falling under Art. 92. This ratio is an indicator for the "efficiency" of state
intervention in attracting new capital.
23  In a certain sense, PPR measures the opportunity
benefits from not having closed former socialist industrial units, an (hypothetical)
alternative for which the expenditure is supposed to have been 0.
In the shipbuilding case, the PPR is very low, indicating a weak return of public
expenditures. The THA expenditures and Art. 92 aid amount to about DM 6.3 billion
(approx. ECU 3.5 billion, see Table 2
24), which implies, at DM 350 billion private
investment, a PPR of only 0.055. The ratio of private investment over state aid is still
very small, at 0.09, implying a ratio of state aid over private investment at about 11/1. In
                                               
22  In this table, and for the remainder of the paper, we do not account for the alleged misuse of state
aids, that may have been committed by the Bremer Vulkan. We assume that - independently of the
outcome of the ongoing legal processes - the restructuring of the yards will go according to the
announced plans. Indeed, the Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (the successor
organization to the Treuhandanstalt) and the Land of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern have pledged their
support to the East German yards, and have announced that they will continue to finance their
restructuring projects after the liquidation of the former owner, the Bremer Vulkan Group.
23 Note that the PPR is not at all a "legally sound" definition; in particular, it does not correspond to the
concept of "investment aid intensity" used as a criterion in the testing of Art. 92 and 93.
24 Not all of these are real costs to the THA (e.g., some of the old debts of other THA-enterprises may
have simply been canceled, or payments covering environmental damage may take years to be used).17
other words, for each DM of state aid about 0.09 DM of private investment was
attracted.
Another useful ratio is expenditures over jobs created (EJC). Again this can be
considered as the opportunity cost for not having created jobs through immediate factory
closures. If one calculates the expenditure per job saved, the East German shipbuilding
industry used a sum of about DM 6.3 billion (including expenditure before privatization,
state aid, and private investment) for about 6,500 permanent jobs in the shipyards, or
approximately DM 1 million (ca. ECU 550,000) for one job created.
3.2 The nature of competition in the European shipbuilding industry
Market structures and overcapacities before 1990
In the 1970s, European shipbuilding entered a permanent state of crisis, due to badly
anticipated demand and the slow pace in which restructuring proceeded in the
structurally weak shipbuilding regions. The EC Council Directives on state aid to the
shipbuilding industry gradually reduced the level of aid to the shipyards from 27% to 9%
(7th Directive, 1991-1995). Still, in the early 1990s, each ship built in an EC country
could benefit from state aid of up to 9% of the sales value. Japan and Korea, the two
largest shipbuilding countries in the world, also practiced different forms of state aid.
As a result, the European as well as the world shipbuilding industry were characterized
by a considerable level of overcapacities in the late 1980s, and almost perfect
competition reigned among the large number of players in the market. World-wide, the
completion of merchant ships decreased from 20.2 m CGT (1975) to 11.7 m CGT in
1990; a decrease of 44%. In 1988, it had even been as low as 8.6 m CGT, only 42% of
the 1975 level. Available capacity was also reduced during that time, but less than
production: from 22 m CGT (1975) to 15 m CGT (1990), i.e., by 32%. Thus,
overcapacity, which was already identified as a structural problem in the late 1970s,
remained high during the 1980s, and particularly so in the 1986-88 crisis. In 1990,
overcapacity was at 27%, in 1991 even 33%. An identical situation prevailed in Western
Europe. Capacity utilization was at only 73% in 1987, and slightly recovered at 77% in
1988 and 84% in 1989, to fall back to 82% in 1990. The Council Directives had not
succeeded in reducing overcapacity significantly. When the East German yards joined the
EU, the latter had already 22% overcapacity (see Tables 3 and 4).
When considering different market segments, the judgment of overcapacities needs to be
slightly modified, but still holds true. As a result of increasing competition from East
Asian low-cost producers in the lower value-added segments, European shipbuilders
went through a period of upgrading capacities and developing a broad range of higher
value-added ships. Thus, in 1992, European shipbuilders still held dominating market
shares in passenger ships and ferries (79.2%), fishing vessels (46.6%), full container
ships (33.0%) and refrigerated cargo ships (34.9%). In contrast, the segments of oil18
tankers (10.2%), bulk carriers (8.9%), Ro-Ro vessels (6.1%) and LNG-tankers (0.0%)
were largely abandoned.
25 Table 5 shows the European market shares for the main
segments of the shipbuilding industry.
Turning to the competition aspects of the industry it is important to realize that there is a
high degree of product flexibility. A yard can relatively easily modify its product mix
within the range of low value-added ships, high value-added ships, and passenger boats
which compose a market segment in and of themselves. The limiting factors of a yard are
the size of the dock, the capacity of the cranes, the block and unit assembly areas, and
the flat panel lines. Thus, product differentiation is difficult. As a result, the supply
structure in European shipbuilding is one of intense competition. In Europe alone,
approximately 25 yards of similar capacity and product range compete with each other;
strategic alliances are not (yet) systematically observed. Competition is on price, delivery
time, and quality (value of reselling); but it is close to "pure" competition without any
particular market power on the side of any yard.
26
Static arguments: state aid was not efficient
We have now assembled the necessary elements to evaluate the impact of state aid on
European competition in the shipbuilding industry. Table 4 already showed the
overcapacities prevailing in the European market before East Germany joined the EC,
i.e., before 1990. If one accepts the premises that through enterprization, "new" capacity
was created in East Germany, one has to consider this as additional capacity from 1991
onwards. The capacities can not be analyzed for particular market segments, as the high
substitutability within shipyards makes it impossible to determine overcapacities for
specific market segments. Moreover, this seems irrelevant for competition policy, since
the relevant market definition is not the segment but the industry as a whole.What one
can do, though, is analyze the contribution of East German shipyards to the overcapacity
problem on a national level. This can provide an indication of how harmful state aid for
new East German yards may have been to competitors.
Table 6 provides an estimation of the "overcapacity-effect" of the East German
shipbuilding industry.
                                               
25 Source: COM (95) 38 final, AWES annual reports, authors' calculations.
26 The main European shipbuilding groups, sometimes encompassing several yards, were: Kvaerner
(Norway), Bremer Vulkan Group, Howaldswerke Deutsche Werft Group, Blohm & Voss, Mayer,
Flender (Germany), Hellenic, Eleusis and Avlis Shipyards (Greece), Chantiers de l'Atlantique,
Aterliers & Chantiers du Havre (France), Fin Cantieri (Italy), Odense Stee Shipyard, Danyard,
Burmeister & Wain (Denmark), Astilleros Espanoles (Spain), Boelwerf Vlaandeeren (Belgium),
v.d.Giesen de Noord (Netherlands), Swan Hunter (UK), Finnyards (Finland), Oskarshamns Varv
(Sweden).19
Two observations can be made from the analysis of overcapacities:
- New capacity in East Germany did not fundamentally alter distribution among the large
European shipbuilding countries, i.e., Denmark, Spain and Italy. Between 1990 and
1994, the European market shares of Denmark and Italy increased; for 1993 this is true
also for Spain. Hence, the smaller shipbuilding countries may have suffered more from
the additional East German capacity.
- The main loser of the 1990s, in terms of market shares, was West Germany. Contrary
to other shipbuilding countries, West Germany never recovered from the 1990 output
decline, when its market share fell from over 30% to the 21%-range.
One other way to analyze the impact of state aid is to check whether the degree of
competition has been increased. State aid might have been justified on the grounds that
it increased competition. The criteria for this test were developed in Section 2. The
analysis yields the following results:
- The amount of state aid is very high, so as to bear no relation to the potential gain in
competition stemming from the new yards under development in East Germany. The
market is in overcapacity, and the efficiency gap between the former East German yards
and the Western European yards is rather considerable. Under these conditions, the
reduction of deadweight losses would appear marginal compared to the ECU 3.5 billion
in public expenditure;
- Scale economies played no role in the process, and hence, cannot be used as an
argument for state aid. Scale economies do exist in the shipbuilding industry: they are
estimated at 5-10% for the first four ships, and 15-30% for the first ten ships of one
series. But potential scale economies gained through extended series in the East German
yards can hardly outweigh the costs of keeping them open.
- Finally, the market structure in the shipbuilding industry must be considered as highly
competitive. As explained above, there is a high degree of supply substitutability; on the
demand side, no particular market power can be detected either. Hence, none of the
static arguments for increasing the level of competition, spelled out in Section 2, applies
to the case of the East German shipbuilding industry.
Dynamic arguments: too early to judge
When adopting a dynamic perspective, things may become somewhat less evident. The
strategy of the THA in the new German Länder had prevented the complete
disappearance of the 540,000 CGT capacity (1990), and would create several hundred
thousand CGT of modern capacity by 1997/98, when restructuring of all East German
yards would be completed. State aid to East German yards may have triggered a
restructuring process that the European shipbuilding industry was due to begin anyway.
The necessity of restructuring the industry has been generally accepted now for several
years, if not decades. With the phasing out of state subsidies of the 7th Council Directive20
on aid to shipbuilding, and the beginning of the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement in 1996,
the European industry faces a profound process of reorganization.
27 In this respect, the
events in East Germany and the strategy followed by the Western European group that
succeeded in East Germany (Kvaerner) may provide an impetus for the rest of the
industry: this concerns the concentration of capacities, mergers, and product
specialization, and the coordination of production among several yards.
The takeover of the three largest East German shipyards has allowed Kvaerner, and
initially, Bremer Vulkan as well, to concentrate production activities and increase
specialization in individual yards. Yard specialization would improve productivity and
yield economies of scale, both in design and assembly. Second, the takeover of yards
facilitates the reduction of capacity within a group, as the closure of any one yard can be
gradually prepared; it is not - as in the case of single-yard firms - "an all-or-nothing"
decision. Finally, the East German case also points in the right direction of international
mergers, a rarity so far in this nationally oriented industry.
28
Let us examine the dynamic arguments for state aid, assuming temporary support only
for potentially viable enterprises. The arguments presented in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2
were already discussed. Under the assumption that THA wanted to save the shipyards
from disappearing, it had to engage in the separation of productive and social assets, and
make sure that the productive assets would not disappear due to short-term illiquidity.
As for the argument in Section 2.2.3, positive externalities were weak. State aid
succeeded in triggering a series of private investments, but the anticipated "bandwagon"
effect of investment has so far not taken place.
Two other reasons indicating that the dynamic effects of state aid may have been more
positive than it seemed from the static perspective. One is simply that it is too early to
say. As most of the decisions made in 1991/93 are carried out only today, it is impossible
to judge the dynamic outcome of shipyard restructuring at this time. The other argument
is that the available empirical evidence implies that the productivity gains of East German
yards might indeed be large. Two or three years from now, the East German yards are
likely to be among the most productive shipyards in Europe. Their average productivity,
in terms of CGT/employee year, could be amongst the best in Europe, and thus, come
close to the best world productivity figures (see Table 7).
29
A close look at the data shows that in reality, the so-called capacity "reduction" in East
Germany from 540,000 CGT to 327,000 CGT does not correspond to any significant
reduction in output from East German yards, as compared to their output in the late
                                               
27 See Kurth, D. (1995): The Shipbuilding Industry in the Years Ahead. Hansa, vol. 132, No. 7, 6-8.
28 The developments described here correspond roughly to the concept of horizontal industrial
restructuring aid developed by the Commission, in particular, DG-III. Among the instruments are the
Maritime Forum, R&D, and standardization polices (cf. COM (93) 526 final: On the way to
conducting a global policy for the maritime industry: first concrete results).
29  Once again, it is assumed that the restructuring of the East German shipyards will be completed
according to the projects that were accepted by the European Commission.21
1980s. In 1994, the restructured East German yards produced exactly the same gross
output as in 1988 (303,000 GT, as compared to 305,000 GT in 1988). Instead, since the
quality of the ships produced increased during that period, one can conclude that the
restructuring of East German shipyards led to an increase in capacity in terms of CGT
(see Table 8). It comes as no surprise that in 1994 East German yards already produced
360,000 CGT of ships, a figure that already exceeds the 327,000 CGT limit demanded by
the Commission.
Rent-shifting: the question of perspective
Finally, the question of the effects of state aid depends on the perspective adopted. If, on
the one hand, we conclude that state aid was inefficient from a European point of view,
this might not be the case from an "East German" point of view, on the other hand. From
a European perspective, the market conditions and overcapacities worsened. That East
Germany benefited from state aid seems plausible. Once restructuring is finished and
employment reduced, the East German yards could belong to the lowest-cost suppliers in
the European Union. Job creation, though limited, is taking place and industrial cores are
developing.
In contrast, other European competitors may be indirectly hurt by the revival of East
German shipbuilding capacity. This is particularly the case for higher-cost producers in
neighboring countries, that are in direct competition with the new yards. It is difficult to
establish a causal link between state aid to East Germany and yard closures in other
European countries. But it seems reasonable to suspect that the 1.6-1.7 m CGT of ships
constructed in East German yards since 1991 have crowded out competitors in other
countries.
3.3  Lessons for other post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe
Leaving competition issues aside, the case of the East German yards can be indicative of
possible developments in other post-socialist countries, whose shipbuilding capacities are
large and relatively modern. Since 1991, the Polish shipyards have overcome the post-
socialist crisis and are more active on the West European and world markets. Already,
Polish ships are among the world price leaders for capsize bulks, Panamax bulk carriers,
factory fishing vessels and small containers (1,900 TEU). Other traditional shipbuilding
countries follow right behind: Croatia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria. The East German
experience teaches three things:
- First, the closure of certain yards must be possible. One central problem of the THA
was its obligation to keep alive, and to modernize, all East German shipyards.
- Second, privatizing a multifunctional shipyard is not a sufficient public policy.
Restructuring can only succeed when the state is capable of imposing the isolation of
productive assets on the former combines.22
- Third, contrary to the East German case, massive capital flows are neither needed nor
possible in Eastern Europe. In East Germany, all steps of restructuring were "planned"
by the THA, and investment projects preceded market demand. Instead, in Eastern
Europe direct access to solvent demand and the integration with shipping companies will
precede restructuring, and be the key determinant of success in the restructuring of any
yard.
4. The enterprization of the East German synthetic fiber industry
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4.1 From a socialist combine to several independent synthetic fiber enterprises
In 1990, the chemical fiber industry of the GDR consisted of one large Kombinat, the
"VEB Chemiefaserkombinat Herbert Warnke" in Schwarza-Rudolstadt; a collection of  8
local factories with close vertical links.
31 Though the production of 330 kt of chemical
fibers corresponded nominally to 10% of Western European output, both the equipment
and the product range were outdated by Western standards:
* the equipment dated largely from the 1960s and had only been marginally updated in
the 1980s,
* over 50% of total output consisted of Cellulosics; the production of which was
decreased in Western economies due to environmental reasons and decreasing
demand (down to 10%, as compared to 90% synthetic fibers),
* the percentage of specific filaments was largely below that of generic staples,
* production was concentrated on low value-added acrylic and polyamide fibers, but few
high-tech fibers (microfibers, PP, Elastan, Aramid),
* 80% of total production was geared to East German and Soviet Union clients, another
10% to other socialist countries, and only 10% sold to hard-currency countries,
* coordination of raw material supplies, know-how and production was difficult among
the eight combines of the Kombinat; the three dominant combines (Schwarza,
Premnitz, Guben) tried to achieve maximum autarchy, whereas the five small units
were for the most part limited to one product.
All in all, the 330 kt were typically what one would call "socialist" capacity.
                                               
30 Synthetic fibers are made from oil or gas: polyester (PES), polyamide (PA), acrylic (PAN) and
polypropylene (PP). Together with cellulosic fibers (made from renewable raw materials, mainly
wood) they make up the category of man-made fibers, or chemical fibers. In this section, we are
concerned with the synthetic fiber industry, only, regulated by the European "Code on aid to the
synthetic fiber industry."
31 Chemiefaserwerke Schwarza-Rudolstadt, Chemiefaserwerk Premnitz, Chemiefaserwerk Guben,
Kunstseiden Pirna, Kunstseidenwerk Elsterberg, Zellstoff- und Zellwollewerke Wittenberge,
Sächsische Zellwolle Plauen, Spinnstoffwerk Glauchau.23
With the currency union between East and West Germany (July 1990) it became evident
that none of the factories in the chemical fiber industry would be competitive under the
new conditions. The sudden increase in input prices (mainly labor, but also raw
materials) and a shift in domestic demand towards Western products dealt a blow to the
industry. The January 1991 disintegration of COMECON - followed one year later by
the breakdown of Russian demand for foreign intermediary products - had a drastic
impact on output and profitability. Whereas production in 1990 was down by "only"
15% from 1989, the industry produced 40% less in 1991; and still, a large part of the 200
kt of production went on stock. In 1990, none of the eight producers of the former
socialist VEB Chemiefaserkombinat made a profit.
32
The Treuhandanstalt strategy to rescue some parts of the industry
As in the shipbuilding industry, the THA pursued an active rescue strategy right from the
beginning. Contrary to the shipbuilding case, though, there was no need for a global
master plan. First, because the interdependency of existing capacities was lower; and
second, because the multifunctionality of the industrial units was less complex, making it
easier to identify potentially viable production capacities. The chemical fiber industry was
also less capacity-intensive than shipbuilding, and finally, much less sensitive politically.
In a first instance, the THA strategy of individual restructuring and subsequent
privatization of some units of the former combine seemed to pay off. Though none of the
big European synthetic fiber producers could be attracted, the THA found a couple of
industry "outsiders" willing to invest in the newly established enterprises. Within 1.5
years, the THA completed the first round of sales. Already by early 1992, the three large
producers (Schwarza-Rudolstadt, Premnitz, Guben) were partially privatized, and the
three smallest ones (Wittenberg, Plauen, Glauchau) prepared for liquidation. Synthetic
fibers thus seemed to have been a "success story" for THA's industrial strategy.
Yet four years later, none of the privatized enterprises has fully succeeded in its
restructuring project; hence, the probability is high that some of them will need further
restructuring. Contrary to the shipbuilding case - where evidence of some success of
restructuring is becoming visible - the synthetic fiber industry has yet to overcome the
errors resulting from over-optimistic assumptions regarding the external conditions of
restructuring and from unrealistic demand projections.
By sketching out the trajectories of the three most important former socialist VEBs, we
point to different types of difficulties in the enterprization of the East German synthetic
fiber industry.
                                               
32 Cf. Treuhandanstalt Dokumentation, Panorama of European Industry (1994), CIRFS-Statistical
Yearbook, IVC, Business Reports of chemical fiber companies.24
4.1.1 Märkische Faser AG: difficulty of core-privatization when there is no core
When the THA took over the "VEB Chemiefaserwerke Friedrich Engels", the VEB-
owned machinery, including a brand new acrylic fiber line (Acrylfaserstraße), was
considered powerful. The combine's capacity of 100 kt of synthetic fibers corresponded
to roughly 15% of total European capacity in that market segment; mainly PAC and PES
staple fibers, destined for the East German and Soviet markets. The Treuhand steering
committee, a group of experts in charge of evaluating the enterprises and counseling the
THA, recommended a quick privatization of the company. The steering committee
estimated investment requirements at about DM 300 million, and the necessary reduction
of the labor force at 50-60%. It was then decided that the THA should guarantee the
survival of the factories by financing at least half of the investment, directly.
The "core"-business of the company, renamed "Märkische Faser AG" in 1990, was
offered to the chemical fiber industry around the world (promotion activities took place
in Germany, France, the US and even Japan). The "non-core" parts were sold separately:
The largest among them, Novoktan GmbH - a factory for the treatment of gasoline, with
220 employees - was given away to Alcor Chemie AG for a price below the DM 2
million nominal capital. Not a single company, however, showed any interest in the core
of Märkische Faser AG. In October 1991, the Treuhandanstalt sold the synthetic fiber
activities of Märkische Faser to the trading company that had already bought the
Novoktan subsidiary, Alcor AG.
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In January 1992, the demand for synthetic fibers from Soviet Union business partners
dropped dramatically, causing severe liquidity problems at Märkische Faser. The THA
continued to fill up the financial bottlenecks of the "privatized" company. But Alcor, the
new owner, refused to put down the promised investment funding, arguing that the
commercial basis for the contract, i.e., markets in East Germany and the Soviet Union,
was no longer valid.
34 In October 1994, Alcor officially withdrew from the privatization
contract, and the THA had to look for another investor. As large Western European
firms continued to be disinterested, the THA convinced a public bank, the West-NBL, a
subsidiary of the WestLB, to act as an "intermediary" investor; once more, in order to
gain time. Between mid-1994 and mid-1995, the only concrete cooperation proposal
came from the Russian Rostextil AG, a consortium of textile companies, several of which
were former clients of the East German combine. While waiting for negotiations to
progress, the West-NBL agreed to invest another 35 million DM into Märkische Faser.
                                               
33 In order to coax Alcor AG into this deal, Treuhandanstalt not only took over DM 175 million of old
debts, but also offered an industrial site of 3 million m². Alcor, in turn, promised to keep 1,700 jobs
and invest at least DM 100 million.
34 Whereas the Treuhandanstalt and the land of Brandenburg continued to provide liquidity support to
Märkische Faser, Alcor showed interest only in the use of the power plant, on site, which also
furnished the Novoktan chemical plant. It thus seems the motivation for Alcor was simply to obtain
control of the power plant.25
4.1.2 Thüringsche Faser AG: Continued splitting-up of a combine
The restructuring of the "VEB Chemiefaserwerke Schwarza-Rudolstadt" is a case in
which a socialist VEB was split up several times in order to attract investors. In 1989,
Rudolstadt was the second largest producer of synthetic fibers in East Germany,
employing 6,500, with a production of about 80 kt of fibers (20 kt PA-6 filaments, 33 kt
viscose staples, 30 kt PA-granulates). Over-staffed and badly equipped, Rudolstadt was
classified a "critical" case by the Treuhandanstalt in mid-1990. The THA received its
only valid offer in mid-1991 from an Indian Textile- and Trading House, Dalmia. Since
Dalmia considered the real capital value of Rudolstadt low, it demanded that the THA
and the Land of Thuringia contribute substantially to its modernization.
35 While Dalmia
took over three main departments of the former combine, the fourth department,
producing fibers for carpets, was separated and sold to another West German company,
"Odenwald". In addition, several auxiliary departments - furnishing both productive and
social services to the combine in socialist times - were leased or sold to their respective
management. Thus, an industrial park developed around the privatized hard core.
In the early stage of privatization things seemed to work out well. Dalmia proceeded
with the creation of three largely independent profit centers, the first two of which were
supposed to grow at a fast rate:
* Viscose staples, whose share in turnover grew to 42% in 1993,
* Plastics (PA-granulates), increasing their share rapidly to 35% of turnover,
* PA-6 polyamide filaments, already operating at a loss in 1991, continued to suffer,
declining to 21% of turnover.
In November 1992, the EC-Commission approved aid by the THA of DM 127 million, in
exchange for a further reduction in capacity.
Yet the move to profitability through increased sales on international markets failed to
materialize, delivering a blow to Dalmia's expansion plans. In 1993, almost half of the
production was still being sold in East Germany; with only 15% being exported to
Western Europe (10%) and overseas (5%). Losses continued to be significant in 1991
(DM -95 million) and 1992 (DM -20 million). As a result, Dalmia threatened to cancel its
obligations unless the THA and the Land of Thuringia provided further aid. In summer
1993, Dalmia withdrew definitely, and Thüringsche Faser was quickly declared bankrupt
and sent into liquidation.
The splitting up of the former combine then continued:
- A West German firm proposed to take over the polyester activities;
                                               
35 The Treuhandanstalt then decided to fix the following conditions for privatization of the hard-core of
the combine: Dalmia had to procure DM 150 million in investment over three years, and maintain at
least 1,000 jobs; whereas the Land of Thuringia and the Treuhandanstalt were to contribute
approximately DM 400 million and DM 127 million of investment subsidies, respectively.26
- machinery and equipment was sold individually;
- the Regional Development Agency of Thuringia took over the 70 ha of land.
By late 1995, about 600 jobs had been created in chemical fiber activities; and it is hoped
that the industrial park will employ another 300-400. The split-up of the former VEB
continues.
4.1.3 Chemiefaserwerke Guben: partial privatization but continued losses
The VEB Chemiefaserwerk Herbert Warnke in Guben, the third largest in GDR until
1990, produced over 60  kt of fibers in 1989 (PA-filaments: 35kt, PES-filaments: 27 kt).
Already in early 1990, Hoechst AG of West Germany identified Guben as a potential
customer for its machinery; only after some initial delay did it develop the project to use
the site for serving the growing East German market. From 1991, Hoechst outsourced
the production of polyamide filaments to Guben, providing its own second-hand
machinery. In 1991, the Guben site was split into two new companies. Hoechst AG took
over the polyamide filament section, while the filaments for carpets were bought by a
former client, the Lausitzer Teppiche. The department for polyester filaments was closed.
Hoechst guaranteed employment of 1,000 (out of 7,100 in 1990!) and new investments
of DM 126 million, 23% of which were to be provided by the Land of Brandenburg. The
rest of the former factory was sold through management buy-out, or closed.
The restructuring of the fiber production facilities at Guben turned out to be a costly
operation for Hoechst, but even more so for the THA which had given a guarantee for
taking over losses during the first years of operation. Faced with a crisis of the European
fiber industry and the unexpected disappearance of Soviet Union and Eastern European
markets, Guben became a permanent loss-maker: In 1992, turnover decreased to DM 86
million, losses were as high as DM 64 million. Consequently, polyamide production was
discontinued in 1993; and instead, a new production line for airbag filaments was put
under construction. In 1993, losses of DM 75 million exceeded turnover (DM 73
million). The restructuring of the Guben site was completed in 1994 with the transfer of
a 6kt yarn-production from Berlin to Guben; which was part of the restructuring of
Hoechst's European fiber production activities. Still, losses remained high: DM 64
million in 1994, at a turnover of DM 107 million. Thus, in the end, all production
capacities inherited from the socialist combine had been closed by Hoechst, with two
new production lines created at Guben. Today, the Hoechst Guben GmbH no longer has
anything to do with the VEB Chemiefaserwerke Herbert Warnke.
The three cases in the synthetic fiber industry imply that the formal act of privatization is
not the central issue for the success of industrial restructuring. Inefficient corporate
governance structures have delayed restructuring and investment. It is not certain
whether the splitting up of the unsold units will continue, whether THA and the Land can
continue to save these enterprises, or whether large synthetic fiber companies have a
future in East Germany. Table 9 provides the basic data on the restructuring of the East
German synthetic fiber industry between 1990 and 1995.27
Once again, we can calculate the two key ratios to obtain quantitative evidence for the
evaluation of the process. The private investment / public expenditure ratio (PPR) is
more favorable than in the shipbuilding case, at 0.12, yet it is fairly low. If one calculates
private investment over approved state aid only, things already look better: with state aid
of about DM 343 million, THA was able to attract private investment of about DM 171
million, i.e., a ratio of exactly 0.50.
Consequently, the ratio of expenditures per job created (EJC) is relatively favorable, i.e.,
low, at DM 390.000 (ECU 215.000) per job. Again, if taking into account state aid only,
the ratio of aid over job creation is still more favorable: for DM 343 million of state aid,
3.495 jobs were created, i.e., DM 100.000 (ECU 54.000) per job. These figures also
support our hypothesis that synthetic fibers were a less important restructuring process
than was shipbuilding.
4.2 The nature of competition in the European synthetic fiber industry
Market structures and overcapacities before 1990
Synthetic fibers is another EU-industry in recurrent crisis since the 1970s. Among the
reasons for this are: high capital-intensity, increasing international competition,
substantial overcapacities due to badly anticipated demand, inadequate market growth
and increasing delocalization of the industry. Since 1977 the Commission, the Member
States and industry tried to curb the spiral between state aid to industry and
overcapacities. A "Code on aid to the synthetic fiber industry", called the synthetic fibers
"Discipline", was enacted in 1977 and extended several times since.
36 The "Discipline" is
supposed to ensure transparency of aid given to synthetic fiber producers, to prevent
subsidization of capacity increases, and to link modernization aid to capacity
reductions.
37
Despite some success, the Discipline did not bring about the expected results. It
succeeded in increasing capacity utilization from an all-time low of 62% (1975) to 86%
(1985). However, overcapacities again increased in the second half of the 1980s. In
1990, the year of German economic and monetary union, capacity utilization in Western
Europe had fallen to 80%. One year later, when the restructuring of the East German
synthetic fibers industry started, it stood at only 77%. Table 10 provides evidence on the
continuous overcapacities in the West European synthetic fibers industry.
Static arguments: state aid seems to have been inefficient
                                               
36 The latest regulation is the 1992-96 "Discipline", Document 92/C 346/02.
37 Panorama of European Industry, CIRFS-Briefing note: The Synthetic Fibers "Discipline". Brussels,
February 1995.28
Once again we make a distinction between the static and the dynamic perspective. From
a static perspective, the impact of the East German synthetic fiber industry on European
competition needs to be analyzed. Just as in the shipbuilding case, we shall consider the
capacity created in the East German factories after 1990 as "new" capacity, i.e., new in
terms of adaptation to the capitalist market economy. This new capacity completely
replaced the "socialist" capacity. The case studies have indeed shown that almost all of
today's production is "new" production, in terms of products and production technology.
Table 11 indicates the development of market shares in the European synthetic fiber
industry before and after the entry of East German producers.
Once again, the static analysis of market shares does not hint at a direct relation between
the new East German capacity and reduced market shares of the main competitors.
Between 1990 and 1994, the three largest synthetic fiber countries, other than Germany,
either increased their European market shares (Spain, Benelux) or kept it constant
(Italy). Instead, the main loser seems to have been the West German producer, whose
market share decreased significantly in this period.
According to the synthetic fibers discipline ("Code on aid to the synthetic fiber industry",
Document 92/C 346/02), the Commission is supposed to "oppose any public financial
support which would result in the installation of new capacity or even in the maintenance
of existing capacities in the synthetic fiber industry". The granting of aid is conditional on
a "significant reduction in the production capacity of the assisted company". In the post-
socialist context of East Germany, the shedding of "socialist" capacity can not be
considered a significant reduction, since it did not represent any market-relevant capacity
at all. On the other hand, aid can be justified for the support of less-favored regions.
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This is clearly the case for all East German producers. Hence, the synthetic fiber
"Discipline" does not provide any conclusive guidance on this particular case.
Finally, we shall analyze whether state aid to East German producers might have been
beneficial to competition within the sector. Here the analysis is straightforward: the data
suggest that the ratio between state aid and the reduction of deadweight losses is much
smaller than in the shipbuilding case. Yet, the absolute level of state aid, i.e. DM 343
million, does not seem justified. The number of competitors in the market was relatively
large, and demand elasticities high. Second, the risk of collusion between incumbents
was low; state aid can not be justified with reduced collusion among competitors. Third,
scale economies again play no major role in the industry structure. Most of the European
companies are multi-product producers, i.e., they produce more than one of the main
synthetic fibers (PA, PES, PP, PAN). Economies of scope exist from producing more
than one fiber (purchase of raw materials, energy, stocking, sales and marketing).
                                               
38 "The Commission is generally sympathetic to investment aid granted to overcome the structural
handicaps of the Community's less-favored regions"; synthetic fiber code, cited above.29
In sum, the market structures in the industry can be considered highly competitive. On
the supply side, more than 30 firms produce synthetic fibers in the EU alone.
39 In the late
1980s, a process of product specialization began in Europe, triggering several exchanges
of production sites between producers.
40 Yet, as of today, none of the strategic moves
towards product differentiation and specialization have led to a significant rationalization
of capacity.
41 On the demand side, the synthetic fiber industry depends mainly on the
development of downstream sectors; in particular, textiles and clothing. The
delocalization of the downstream sectors implied a delocalization of synthetic fibers, too.
The number of clients for the synthetic fiber industry is practically unlimited; no
individual consumer has any market power. Given the overcapacities and the atomistic
supply and demand structures in the European synthetic fiber market, there is no reason
to believe that the entry of new East German producers has benefitted competition.
We conclude, from the point of view of static competition analysis, that there is no
economic justification for the state aid provided to East German synthetic fiber
producers.
Dynamic arguments: dependent upon the success of pending cases
When checking the three dynamic arguments for state aid (separation of productive and
social functions, avoidance of premature liquidation, positive externalities), the first two
seems to hold. The THA aid certainly prevented the producers from immediate collapse,
and thus limited the danger of an immediate devaluation of capital assets. As shown in
the Thüringsche Faser and Guben cases, the only way to save some parts of the industry
was to split up productive assets, and continue doing so until some of the pieces found
an investor. On the other hand, positive externalities were hardly attained in the synthetic
fibers industry. The strategic value of East German plants for Western producers
continues to be low. In the restructuring processes of the entire synthetic fiber industry,
only two Western groups showed some interest (Hoechst and Rhône Poulenc), and still
their contribution remained limited.
Contrary to the shipbuilding industry, the future of the East German synthetic fiber
industry is difficult to assess. Three relatively small units are currently being developed,
which may become European leaders in a small number of niche products. But the future
                                               
39 See CIRFS-Yearbook; in alphabetical order: Azko Nobel, Allied Signal, Aquafil, BASF, Bayer,
Brilen, Courtaulds, Du Pont de Nemours, Enichem/Montefibre, Fabelta Ninove, Filanda, FISIPE,
Hoechst, INACSA, Inquitex, Kemira, Lenzing, Miroglio, Moplefan, Novaceta, Novalis, Nurel,
Nylstar, Rhône-Poulenc, La Seda de Barcelona, SNIA, SNIACE, Svenska Rayon, Textile Produkte,
UNIFI, Val Lesina, Wellman International.
40 This process led in 1992/93 to several direct exchanges of companies between large chemical fiber
groups. For example, ICI sold its acrylic-production to DuPont and BASF; each in turn received a
polyamide and a polypropylen unit, respectively. Allied Signal and Azko, Rhône-Poulenc and SNIA,
respectively, joined their activities in polyamide production.
41 Panorama of European industry, 1994, p. 6-66.30
of capacity and production in the two largest combines (Märkische and Thüringsche) is
still unclear. If the current projects succeed, the East German synthetic fiber industry will
be small, but competitive. If the projects do not succeed, the new East German capacities
pose no serious threat to the rest of the European synthetic fiber industry. This is, again,
in contrast to the shipbuilding case discussed above: first evidence implies that the
restructuring of the West European synthetic fiber industry, which in any event seems to
be inevitable, is not significantly hampered by aid to East Germany. Table 12 provides a
scenario for the East German chemical fiber industry for the year 1996/97, when
restructuring is supposed to have ended.
The rent-shifting argument does not apply here fully. Certainly the "big winners" of state
aid were the East German enterprises, that may boast Europe's most modern capacities in
a few years. From a European perspective, chances that the aid had some negative
impact are high. The synthetic fibers industry continues to operate on very small margins
and relatively high capital intensity. European producers already operating on the verge
of market-exit may have been driven out of the market. However, clear-cut evidence of
this does not exist.
The restructuring in East Germany could be used as an opportunity for reorganizing
business structures, as the Hoechst-Guben case has shown. But no immediate adverse
effects on European industry can be detected from the state aid provided to East German
synthetic fibers. The future will tell whether the large cases pending will pay off for
public and private investment.
Conclusion
State aid, restructuring and privatization in the new German Länder should be analyzed
in a perspective unknown to European competition policy before 1990: post-socialism.
The transformation of socialist to capitalist industrial structures required a specific grid
of analysis, that was rapidly developed for East Germany. It remains relevant to other
post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as they approach EU-
membership. Articles 92 and 93 of the EC-Treaty were bent to their extremes in order to
cope with state aid in a country where almost no producer would have withstood EU-
competition without support. In a rapid learning process, the THA lived up to the task of
splitting up former socialist industrial units, until the last part had found an investor, or
was closed.
It is difficult to judge the outcome of East German industrial restructuring today, as most
of the decisions made in 1991/93 are currently being carried out; in particular, with
respect to investment projects. Econometric modeling of the impact of East German
restructuring on European competition is impossible, since the results of the
restructuring have not yet fully come to the fore.
42 Nonetheless, qualitative analysis can
                                               
42 Also, data on East German enterprises is not easily obtained, since THA-owned enterprises are not
obliged to publish business reports nor financial statements.31
be done for the most important sector in which the THA-intervention was massive, such
as: shipbuilding, metal, coal and potash mining, steel and non-ferrous metals, chemistry
and refining, chemical fibers, mechanical engineering, automobiles and electronics.
We conclude from a competition policy point of view that the results of five years of the
THA's efforts in the shipbuilding and synthetic fibre industries have to be judged as
negative in a static perspective, and as questionable in a dynamic perspective. The THA's
aid created "new" capacity, i.e. capacity directed towards Western European and world
markets. This is the case for both the 327,000 CGT capacity in the East German
shipbuilding industry, and about 150,000 t in synthetic fibers. In neither case did state aid
contribute to an increase of European competition. Instead, the problem of
overcapacities worsened. 
43
In a dynamic perspective, the outcome of state aid to East German enterprises is still
open. Though public expenditures were very high (i.e. the THA expenditures before
privatization and state aid according to Art. 92 stricto sensu), dynamic restructuring
processes were triggered that may have some positive impact on the European industry
at large. In both cases, shipbuilding and synthetic fibers, the outphasing of EC-regulation
is a contribution factor to industry dynamics in the early 1990s. Product specialization,
extended use of scale economies, and cross-country mergers and capacity management
were triggered in East Germany, possibly indicating future developments in the European
industry .
We also stress the point that what looks like a losing game from the European
perspective may be a winning game from a regional perspective. This is certainly the case
for the new Länder of East Germany, that - without massive state aid - would have
perished from the economic map. Thus, new East German industrial sites benefited in the
form of a huge qualitative push, both in terms of equipment and in labor productivity.
                                               
43 Quantitative analysis for other sectors indicates similar results. Take the steel industry, for example,
where Western Europe had just featured two overcapacity crises, in the mid-1980s (capacity
utilization of 67% in 1986/87), and again, in the early 1990s (72%, 71%, 69% in 1990/91/92,
respectively): East German capacity was reduced from 8mt (1989), modern capacity of 3mt (1995)
was built, one third with significant state investment aid. Market structures in the steel industry were
slightly oligopolistic in the late 1980s, but the arrival of mini-mills has led to fully competitive
structures since. In lignite mining, competition between producers and between energy sources was
also high. The output decline of East German lignite was spectacular: in a sector in which East
Germany, the world's largest producer, was considered to have had a comparative advantage,
production fell by 69% (from 301 million t in 1989 to 94 million t in 1992; i.e., a 69% reduction).
The modernization of the remaining capacities did not lead to an increase in competition in
European mining. Chemistry and refining features probably the most striking aid/capacity
relations; the new refinery in Leuna, if it ever goes on line, will have cost about DM 6-10 billion for
production in a sector that already features full competition and excess capacities of about 4-5
million t/year; i.e., over 10% of production in the region (excluding light benzine; see Helie, Marie-
José (1994): Perspectives sur les raffinage européen. Ecole des Mines de Paris). The same analysis
holds for automobile production as well: the factories of the "Trabant" and "Wartburg" (still
featuring models of the 1950s/60s) could not but perish immediately; the new capacities built on site,
several hundred thousand car units (VW and Opel) could have been installed in other European
plants.32
With massive state aid, some large enterprises have been developed that are on the
leading edge of Europe or even world-wide. When the investment projects underway are
finished in a couple of years, the East German industry will boast a qualitative jump
towards the most modern production facilities and organization. Shipbuilding and
synthetic fibers are but two examples of this. Other branches in which modernization led
to leading-edge technologies developed in East Germany are the optical industry, steel,
chemical refining, semiconductors, and automobiles. Whether these units will remain
"cathedrals in the deserts" (Grabher, 1993, term chosen because the high-tech factories
are not backed by an industrial Hinterland) or whether they are the industrial cores of
flourishing, self-sustaining industrial landscapes remains an open issue.
While the East German cases of state aid were a novelty for the EC-competition policy,
they should also be considered as a forerunner to the integration of other post-socialist
countries into the EU. These countries' industries are already in the process of changing
the competitive situation in the new Europe: for example in shipbuilding, automotive
steel, energy or food processing. Central and Eastern European countries will not follow
the capital-intensive East German pattern of industrial restructuring. But in almost all
sectors, state aid will play a significant role in the recovery process of these industries.
EU politics and research will need to cope with the post-socialist specificities in order to
handle these newly emerging challenges to competition policy.33
Table 1: From the socialist Mathias Thesen Werft VEB to the MTW Schiffswerft
GmbH: - A case of creating "new" capacities
Under Socialism (1989) After Restructuring (1997/98)
Name Mathias Thesen Werft VEB
(factory of the people)
MTW Schiffswerft GmbH
Owner Schiffbau-Kombinat Rostock,
controlled by the Communist
Party and its "Plan"
Taken over by the BvS (ex-
Treuhandanstalt) and the Land of
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, after
the liquidation of the former
owner, the Bremer Vulkan Group
Berths 2 small open building berths for
shipsizes 87x25 m (5,000 t) and
206x32 m (8,000 t)
New dry dock, 340x67 m;
"compact yard 2000"
Product Range Fishing vesels and refrigirator
ships; multi-purpose transport
vessels; containerships




Maximum Size Ships 40,000 dead weight tons 300,000 dwt
Markets, Competition Bartered with USSR;
competition: none
Mainly European markets,
competition with West European,
and, increasingly Polish
shipyards
Employment 6,000 (including social functions) 1,388
Capacity 135,000 CGT "socialist" capacity ca. 100,000 CGT "new" capacity34
Table 2: Basic data on the restructuring of the East German shipbuilding industry, 1990-1995 (as of December 1995)













(FROM 1990 => 1994)
1) MTW Schiffswerft
GmbH, Wismar (MTW)
taken over by the BvS
(ex-Treuhandanstalt)




















686.5 Mill. DM Total Aid: 997.4 Mill. DM of
which:
xoperating aid: 597.2 Mill. DM
(losses to be covered: 458.8
Mill. DM; injection of fresh
capital: 57.7 Mill. DM; write-off
part of old current liabilities:
80.7 Mill. DM)
xinvestment aid: 337.2 Mill.DM







taken over by the BvS
(ex-Treuhandanstalt)



























665.3 Mill. DM Total Aid: 1,087.7 Mill. DM of
which:
xoperating aid: 680.5 Mill.DM
(40% of old current liabilities:
108.5 Mill. DM; injection of
fresh capital: 50.0 Mill. DM;
loss compensation during
restructuring: 522.0 Mill. DM)
x investment aid: 398.7 Mill.
DM









x gas and oil
carriers (up to
160,000 dwt)












989.6 Mill. DM Total Aid: 1,247.7 Mill. DM of
which:
xoperating aid: 745 Mill. DM
(40% of old current liabilities:
82.4 Mill. DM; injection of fresh
capital: 105.0 Mill. DM; loss
compensation during
restructuring: 557.6 Mill.DM)
xinvestment aid: 474.9 Mill.DM

















(FROM 1990 => 1994)
4) Peene Werft GmbH,
Wolgast
Hegeman-group x chemical tankers








141.7 Mill. DM Total Aid: 391.1 Mill. DM
of which:
xoperating aid: 157.7 Mill. DM
(40% of old current liabilities:
15.0 Mill. DM; loss
compensation during
restructuring: 142.7 Mill.DM)
xinvestment aid: 173.1 Mill.DM















n.a. Total Aid: 137.1 Mill. DM
of which:
xoperating aid: 110.1 Mill. DM
(injection of fresh capital: 5
Mill. DM; loss compensation
during restructuring: 105.1
Mill. DM)
xinvestment aid:  14.0 Mill. DM






taken over by the BvS
(ex-Treuhandanstalt)











0 n.a. n.a. BV: ca. 100
Mill. DM








0 n.a. 9 Mill. DM 2000 => some
hundreds
TOTAL 327,000 cgt ca. 2,483 Mill. DM 3,825 Mill. DM 350 Mill. DM ca. 8.000 in
shipbuilding: ca.
6.000
* In the GDR, the Neptun and Warnow shipyards belonged to the same socialist enterprise, called Neptun Warnow Werft, employing 10,000 on 1 July 1990, some transfers of
personnel took place from the closed Neptun Werft to the Kvaerner Warnow Werft
** Composed of: relief of old debts; compensation of losses on orders contracted prior to July 1990; payments connected to the repairing of environmental damage.36




1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
EU BELGIUM 130 96 83 173 102 124 45 26 47 36 72 22 98 5 66
DENMARK 382 344 329 339 355 444 351 194 277 287 306 351 415 354 307
FRANCE 268 443 353 357 357 164 145 208 63 199 114 171 182 65 103
GERMANY /1 673 1270 1182 1268 1165 1143 1067 765 885 847 1002 810 958 853 961
GREECE 13 5 62 36 40 44 25 7 12 13 466070
IRELAND 3 17 0 1900000000000
ITALY 346 359 156 217 182 124 61 225 120 285 328 424 289 496 440
NETHERLANDS 250 342 390 416 259 310 263 146 153 172 264 357 271 236 319
PORTUGAL 35 6 31 125 19 40 61 26 23 46 65 39 64 62 17
SPAIN 441 557 587 489 346 400 230 328 326 306 365 301 428 365 233
UNITED KINGDOM 459 243 394 319 305 164 142 162 113 157 145 171 140 148 139
TOTAL EU-12 2999 3682 3568 3757 3131 2959 2388 2088 2020 2346 2703 2651 2845 2592 2585
OTHER FINLAND 372 408 441 503 419 283 260 145 263 321 379 212 210 191 123
AWES NORWAY 324 342 448 278 175 222 163 181 155 79 158 249 311 203 195




4029 4853 4709 4832 3906 3591 2927 2537 2510 2781 3285 3158 3399 3010 2902
JAPAN 5207 5581 5811 4908 6951 6498 5085 3795 2953 3664 4456 4417 4379 4854 5177
KOREA 446 512 880 986 1015 1633 1971 1194 1505 1389 1564 1730 1995 1835 2104
CHINA n.a. 28 105 170 298 172 215 207 253 230 304 255 282 446 481
POLAND 498 346 370 277 382 358 340 300 344 238 177 223 306 264 402




1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
BULGARIA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 71 62 71 79
USSR 425 600 504 475 690 274 170 44 56 227 482 365
RUSSIA 22 156 97
UKRAINE 119 153 210
YUGOSLAVIA 171 225 221 217 237 281 188 3 230 328 293 240 21
CROATIA 238 104 165
REST OF WORLD 1860 1696 1989 1687 1520 1361 1242 1165 747 1024 1095 941 1150 1415 1378
TOTAL WORLD 12635 13841 14588 13552 14998 14189 12139 9245 8598 9881 11656 11526 12118 12380 12636
1/ From 1990, data includes production from Ex-GDR yards
Sources: EEC Report of the Commission to the Council on the state of the shipbuilding industry, COM (95) 38 final, table 5a
Sources: EEC Report of the Commission to the Council on the state of the shipbuilding industry, COM (95) 38 final, Table 5a44
                                               
44 1/: Data includes production from GDR-yards.38
Table 4: Overcapacities on the European and world shipbuilding market




18400 18600 18800 18400 18000 17300 16000 15500 15200 15000 14800 15300 15800 16200 16700
WORLD CAPACITY
UTLISATION
69% 74% 78% 74% 83% 82% 76% 60% 57% 66% 79% 75% 77% 76% 76%
WORLD
OVERCAPACITY








n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 73% 77% 84% 82% 83% 90% 86% 81%
EUROPEAN
OVERCAPACITY
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37% 30% 19% 22% 20% 11% 16% 23%
Sources: AWES annual reports; COM (95) 38 final; CSCN (1995): La situation internationale; author´s calculations45
                                               
45 Data for European capacity: EU-15 plus Norway.39
Table 5: European market shares in the main shipbuilding market segments
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Oil Tankers 9.4% 6.4% 10.6% 5.5% 15.2% 3.3% 0.0% 7.7% 14.9% 11.3% 13.1% 11.2% 19.5% 7.0% 5.2%
Bulk Carriers 9.8% 9.9% 8.5% 2.1% 4.3% 3.9% 8.3% 4.4% 0.0% 2.9% 12.6% 9.4% 0.0% 6.0% 3.3%
Cargo Ships 21.4% 27.0% 19.2% 17.6% 19.9% 19.4% 18.3% 23.0% 27.5% 21.4% 23.6% 21.3% 21.4% 21.8% 21.9%
Non Cargo Vessels 32.3% 24.9% 29.4% 20.2% 22.9% 22.0% 25.4% 28.7% 47.8% 43.1% 42.5% 28.3% 39.0% 50.9% 45.7%
Total 17.2% 18.6% 18.4% 10.9% 14.8% 14.1% 16.7% 20.2% 24.8% 20.3% 22.0% 18.2% 19.9% 20.1% 17.2%
Source: COM (95) 38 final, table 840
Table 6: Market shares in European shipbuilding (production), 1987-1994
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
East Germany 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.3% 7.4% 8.2% 12.0%
West Germany 30.1% 35.3% 30.4% 21.7% 21.2% 19.3% 21.8% 21.5%
Denmark 7.6% 11.0% 10.3% 9.3% 11.1% 12.2% 11.8% 10.6%
Spain 12.9% 13.0% 11.0% 11.1% 9.5% 12.6% 12.1% 8.0%
Italy 8.9% 4.8% 10.2% 10.0% 13.4% 8.5% 16.5% 15.2%
Rest of Western
Europe
40.5% 35.9% 38.1% 47.9% 32.5% 40.0% 29.6% 32.7%
Western Europe
(AWES)
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Sources: AWES annual reports; COM (95) 38 final; VSM Jahresberichte
Table 7: Future productivity estimates for the East German yards: compared to







East German MTW Werft 1,300 - 1,500 100 ca. 0.018 - 0.020
shipyards Volkswerft
Stralsund
1,800 - 2,000 85 0.022 - 0.025
Kvaerner Warnow
Werft
1,800 - 2,000 85 0.02 - 0.025
Peene-Werft 750 - 850 35 0.02 - 0.025







Good World 0.011 - 0.017
Sources: AWES Statistical Yearbooks; VSM Yearbooks; Treuhand-Dokumentation; author´s
calculations41
Table 8: Completion of East German shipyards, 1985-199446
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Number of ships
completed
69 65 47 38 37 33 31 33 35 42
1.000 GT 361 387 331 305 300 263 285 221 246 303
1.000 CGT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 409 387 252 311 360
Value (in Mill. DM) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1351 1255 1012 1389 1700
Sources: AWES annual reports; VDM annual report 1994; Treuhandanstalt-Dokumentation
                                               
46 Sources: AWES annual reports, VDM annual reports, Treuhandanstalt Dokumentation.42
Table 9: Basic data on the restructuring of the East German chemical fibers industry, 1990-1995




















GmbH (takeover from the
State of Thuringia (LEG)
after failed privatization to
Dalmia-Group, India)
x polyester filaments: 15 kt
x polyamide granulate: 6 kt
x polyester granulate: 6 kt
x viscose fibers: 45 kt
x takeover of old debts: 200
Mill DM
x liquidity credits: 210 Mill DM
x capital provision: 40 Mill DM
Total Aid: 127 Mill. DM (N
553/92)
x Aid Intensity: 23%
(Gemeinschaftsaufgabe)
x Investment Aid: 8%
Dalmia: 0,5 Mill. DM
potential investor:
Zipperling-Kesler &







West NBL (subsidiary of
the public Westdeutsche
Landesbank (West LB),
after failed privatization to
Alcor Chemie AG
(Switzerland)
x acrylic fibers: 35 kt
x polyester fibers: 38 kt
x viscose silk: 3.3 kt
x takeover of old debts: 75 Mill.
DM
x liquidity credits: 143 Mill. DM
x free transfer of 300 ha of
land
x repurchase of land: 20 Mill.
DM (no aid, IF it is a "market
price")
Total Aid: 80. 2 Mill DM (N
468/92) of which:
x Grant: 39.2 Mill. DM
x Guarantee: 41.0 Mill. DM
WestNBL pledged 35




Hoechst AG (taken over
one fourth of the former
plant)
x PA-filaments: 5 kt
x PES-filaments: 17 kt
x PA/PES high-tenacity
fibers 5 kt
x takeover of losses for 1992-
94: 204 Mill. DM




x Investment aid (12% /
8%): 9.1 Mill. DM
xCreation of High Quality























between Snia Fiber SpA
and Rhône-Poulenc SA)
x new production of poly-
amide fibers PA 6.6 textile
filament yard 1,875 t
x Polyester filaments: 17 kt




n.a. Total Aid: 7.15 Mill. DM (N
12/93) of which:
x Grant 5.3 Mill. DM
x Investment Aid: 1.9 Mill.
DM





Maltzahn KG (Nottuln) x PA-6 granulates 22 kt
x PA-6 filaments: 10 kt
x PP-filaments: 2 kt
- 56.3 Mill. DM of which:
x liquidity: 5.2 Mill. DM
x global collateral: 51.1 Mill.DM
(loss compensation on deals




State Aid (N678/93 and













private enterprise x polyester staple: 9.2 kt Total Aid 5.7 Mill. DM of
which:
x GA "Verbesserung der
regionalen Wirtschafts-
struktur): 3.4 Mill. DM
x Investment Tax
Allowance: 1.3 Mill. DM
9.8 Mill. DM 80
TOTAL 1,028 Mill. DM 343.13 Mill. DM 171.1 Mill. DM 3,495
* files not yet closed
** Composed of: relief of old debts; compensation of losses on orders contracted prior to July 1990; payments connected to the repairing of environmental damage.44
Table 10: Capacities and overcapacities in the West European (EU-15 + Switzerland) synthetic fibers industry
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Capacity (1,000 t) 3.211 3.202 3.089 3.017 3.025 3.087 3.126 3.161 3.218 3.350 3.488 3.615 3.616 3.625 3.634
Production (1,000 t) 2.168 2.359 2.190 2.362 2.516 2.662 2.632 2.671 2.701 2.735 2.798 2.788 2.892 2.781 2.991
European share of world market 22% 22% 22% 21% 21% 20% 20% 21% 20% 20% 19% 18%
Capacity utlisation 68% 74% 71% 78% 83% 86% 84% 84% 84% 82% 80% 77% 80% 77% 82%
Overcapacities 47% 35% 41% 28% 20% 16% 19% 19% 19% 22% 25% 30% 25% 30% 22%45
Table 11: Market shares in the European synthetic fiber industry (production),
1988-1994
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
East Germany 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 4.1% 4.1% 2.6%
West Germany 26.9% 26.6% 26.2% 21.4% 21.5% 23.6% 22.8%
Italy 21.5% 20.4% 21.1% 21.1% 21.1% 22.7% 20.8%
Benelux 5.7% 7.6% 0.8% 8.9% 8.5% 8.6% 9.4%
Spain 8.8% 8.5% 8.3% 8.2% 8.5% 8.6% 9.1%
Rest of Western
Europe
37.1% 36.9% 43.6% 36.0% 36.3% 32.4% 35.3%
Western Europe
(incl. Turkey)
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 12: Changing capacities in the East-German chemical fiber industry






(in 1000 t, estimates)
Polyester Staples 44.4 44 20 - 30
Polyester Filaments 27.4 26 15 - 30
Polyamide Staples 6.3 0 0
Polyamide Filaments 54.6 21 19 - 25
Polyacryl Staples 58.6 59 20 - 30
PP Filaments 0 7 7
PVC Staples 1.6 0 0
Viscose Staples 120.7 98 36
Viscose Filaments 23.7 12 10 - 15
Polyurethane Filaments 0.4 0.4 0 - 1
Polyester Granulates 0 6 6 - 10
GRAND TOTAL 337.7 264.4 134 - 18446
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